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Gaddafi Rise to Power in Libya: Libyan Revolution 1969-1972

ebook

The rise and solidifying of power in Libya by Muammar al-Qaddafi and his relationship with the United States as seen through original U.S. government documents.

This 534 page document collection includes an image of each original page of each document and a text transcription. This volume is compiled from documentation generated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, the NSC staff, and the records of the Department of State. It also includes documentation from the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Kissinger papers.

In August of 1969 King Idris of Libya was in Turkey for medical treatment. On September 1, 1969 a group of about 70 junior Libyan military officers lead by Muammar Gaddafi took the opportunity to stage a bloodless coup d'état. On September 8, 1969, the Libyan revolutionary council promoted Captain Gaddafi to colonel and appointed him commander in chief of the Libyan Armed Forces, making him the new de facto head of state.

Documents show Libya was the country the U.S. believed had the most potential for problems in North Africa. American officials recognized that it did not want to tie the U.S. to the authoritarian and corrupt monarchy of King Idris. The U.S. recognized the new Libyan government soon after the September 1969 coup.

The area of contention with Libya the U.S. was most concerned about was the American Wheelus Air Force Base located in Libya. Gaddafi considered Wheelus, which was built by the Italian Air Force in 1923, as a vestige of European colonialism. The Nixon administration concluded that it was in the interest of the U.S., particularly oil assets, to withdraw from the base.

Libya's main concern was the delivery of U.S. jet aircraft, the United States had agreed to sell the previous Libyan government. Documents show U.S. officials deliberating over the arms sale to Libya. Some thought completing the sale might prevent Libya from nationalizing American and European oil company assets. The President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, vacillated on the question, at first siding with the opinion that no gesture would make the Libyan government less hostile. Later, Kissinger considered releasing the F-5s in order to protect American oil interests.

The Nixon Administration decided that the sale of the eight F-5 aircraft would not make relations with Tripoli better and denied delivery. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Ambassador Joseph Palmer believed that the U.S. should make some effort to accommodate the Libyans on the question of the F-5 sales, which Deputy Secretary of State John Irwin argued could protect U.S. oil investments.

Documentation in this collection demonstrates that while Libya and the rest of North Africa was considered important enough for the U.S. to wish to retain the region in the western camp and prevent inroads into the area by the Soviet Union or Arab radicals, North Africa was not a high priority for U.S. foreign policy under President Nixon. As a result, demands for changes in U.S. policy towards Israel, or increased military aid or sales, generally received political and diplomatic, but basically non-committal responses from Washington.

U.S. Government policy analysts advised Nixon that by actively engaging the countries of North Africa and by encouraging European allies of the U.S. to do the same, the area could be kept free of Soviet domination.

These documentary records indicate that in the end, the Nixon Administration decided to maintain diplomatic relations with Libya and use its economic connections in the hopes of influencing the new military government towards a more pro-Western stance.


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  • Release date: November 7, 2011

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  • Release date: November 7, 2011

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The rise and solidifying of power in Libya by Muammar al-Qaddafi and his relationship with the United States as seen through original U.S. government documents.

This 534 page document collection includes an image of each original page of each document and a text transcription. This volume is compiled from documentation generated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, the NSC staff, and the records of the Department of State. It also includes documentation from the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Kissinger papers.

In August of 1969 King Idris of Libya was in Turkey for medical treatment. On September 1, 1969 a group of about 70 junior Libyan military officers lead by Muammar Gaddafi took the opportunity to stage a bloodless coup d'état. On September 8, 1969, the Libyan revolutionary council promoted Captain Gaddafi to colonel and appointed him commander in chief of the Libyan Armed Forces, making him the new de facto head of state.

Documents show Libya was the country the U.S. believed had the most potential for problems in North Africa. American officials recognized that it did not want to tie the U.S. to the authoritarian and corrupt monarchy of King Idris. The U.S. recognized the new Libyan government soon after the September 1969 coup.

The area of contention with Libya the U.S. was most concerned about was the American Wheelus Air Force Base located in Libya. Gaddafi considered Wheelus, which was built by the Italian Air Force in 1923, as a vestige of European colonialism. The Nixon administration concluded that it was in the interest of the U.S., particularly oil assets, to withdraw from the base.

Libya's main concern was the delivery of U.S. jet aircraft, the United States had agreed to sell the previous Libyan government. Documents show U.S. officials deliberating over the arms sale to Libya. Some thought completing the sale might prevent Libya from nationalizing American and European oil company assets. The President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, vacillated on the question, at first siding with the opinion that no gesture would make the Libyan government less hostile. Later, Kissinger considered releasing the F-5s in order to protect American oil interests.

The Nixon Administration decided that the sale of the eight F-5 aircraft would not make relations with Tripoli better and denied delivery. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Ambassador Joseph Palmer believed that the U.S. should make some effort to accommodate the Libyans on the question of the F-5 sales, which Deputy Secretary of State John Irwin argued could protect U.S. oil investments.

Documentation in this collection demonstrates that while Libya and the rest of North Africa was considered important enough for the U.S. to wish to retain the region in the western camp and prevent inroads into the area by the Soviet Union or Arab radicals, North Africa was not a high priority for U.S. foreign policy under President Nixon. As a result, demands for changes in U.S. policy towards Israel, or increased military aid or sales, generally received political and diplomatic, but basically non-committal responses from Washington.

U.S. Government policy analysts advised Nixon that by actively engaging the countries of North Africa and by encouraging European allies of the U.S. to do the same, the area could be kept free of Soviet domination.

These documentary records indicate that in the end, the Nixon Administration decided to maintain diplomatic relations with Libya and use its economic connections in the hopes of influencing the new military government towards a more pro-Western stance.


Expand title description text